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Any form of Brexit will impact heterogeneously in 
terms of sectors and regions on the competitive posi-
tion of firms in both the UK and Europe. The ongoing 
uncertainty about the conditions under which the UK 
will be leaving the EU creates difficulties in structur-
ally estimating these impacts. Using uniquely detailed 
interregional trade data on goods and services for the 
EU, we apply a novel methodology that disentangles 
region-sector sensitivities (elasticities) of firms’ com-
petitive positions to (non)tariff barriers from the 
implications of different post-Brexit UK–EU trade 
scenarios. This enables us to derive the economic 
geography of competitive opportunities and vulner-
abilities of Brexit of firms, along with the degree of 
uncertainty that surrounds these effects, independently 
from scenarios. Our analysis demonstrates that the 
adverse international competitive vulnerabilities of 
UK regions are much larger than those of the rest of 
the EU due to the dependency of the UK on the EU 
via global value chains. The impact on the competi-
tive positions of firms means that within the UK, 
Brexit is likely to increase interregional inequalities. 
In contrast, interregional inequalities across Europe 
may actually fall, depending on the nature of the post- 
Brexit UK–EU trading arrangements. Moreover, the 
key political focus on the nature of the post-Brexit 
arrangements appears to be misplaced in that most 
UK regions are rather insensitive to the specific nature 
of the deal. As such, the economic geography impli-
cations of Brexit appear to be largely unrelated to UK 
domestic political narratives.
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The exact nature of the post-Brexit UK–EU trade 
relationship is not known and may be uncertain for 
a long period of time. However, the very short time 
period for negotiating a new agreement, along with 
the position set out by the UK government in early 
2020, strongly suggests that the final UK–EU trading 
arrangement will be akin to something like a more 
limited version of the EU–Canada trade agreement or 
even the more distant EU–Australia agreement, if not 
a default to a so-called hard Brexit, which involves 
the UK reverting to World Trade Organization (WTO) 
trade rules (UK Trade Policy Observatory 2016; 
Stojanovic 2018; O’Carroll 2020; Peston 2020; The 
Economist 2020), a scenario that will bring many 
challenges with it. Importantly, both the Canadian or 
Australian types of agreements imply a profound 
change in the nature of UK–EU trading relationships 
because both set-ups are very much closer in terms of 
their regulatory architecture to a hard Brexit based on 
WTO trading rules than they are to remaining in 
the single market via EU membership, membership 
in the European Economic Area, or membership in the 
European Free Trade Association. Indeed, the likely 
end point of the UK–EU negotiations will position the 
UK further away in trade-governance terms from the 
EU than either Turkey or the Ukraine.1 The large 
majority of evidence implies that the potential impli-
cations of a no-deal Brexit suggest that there will be 
strong adverse implications for all UK regions as well 
as some other EU regions. More specifically, the 
exposure of regional economies to cross-border trade 
is likely to be more serious for many of the largely 
Leave-voting, geographically noncore and economi-
cally weaker regions of the UK than they are for the 
geographically core, economically stronger and large-
ly Remain-voting regions of the UK (Los et al. 2017; 
Chen et al. 2018; Billing, McCann, and Ortega- 
Argilés 2019). In particular, the UK regions, which 
are generally close to continental Europe, typically 
face lower levels of Brexit trade-risk exposure than 
UK regions geographically further away from main-
land Europe, except for Scotland. These conclusions 
were first established by Los et al. (2017) and Chen 
et al. (2018) and have subsequently been confirmed 
by a dozen or so different papers and reports using 
different research techniques and data sets (Billing, 
McCann, and Ortega-Argilés 2019). At the same time, 
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it was also established by Chen et al. (2018) that for many EU member states and 
regions, and especially those geographically noncore and economically weaker regions 
situated in the far south, the far east, and the far north of Europe, the economic 
exposure to Brexit was very minimal (Chen et al. 2018) in comparison to the exposure 
faced by regions in the UK, Ireland, or the core regions in northwestern Europe. In 
particular, EU regions in continental Europe close to the UK were far more exposed to 
Brexit trade-related risks than those that are geographically further away from the UK. 
The value-chain positions of regionally specialized industries play an important role 
here in determining these differing regional exposure levels.
The aim of this article is to dig deeper into the regional implications of Brexit and 
more specifically to consider how Brexit will impact the competitive vulnerability or 
opportunity of industries in different regions at the level of NUTS2 regions in Europe 
and how robust these implications are with respect to different types of Brexit agree-
ments. The relationship between competitiveness and changes in locational and trade 
network characteristics is complex (Krugman 1996; Baldwin and Wyplosz 2009). In 
this article, we do not focus on the competitiveness of firms, per se, but rather on their 
competitive position within industry-region–specific networks, including those that 
cross UK–EU international borders. We examine how the competitive positioning of 
sectors in each region will change due to the increasing tariff- and nontariff-related 
costs associated with Brexit. This allows us to identify the extent to which each sector 
in each region needs to restructure in order to offset these cost increases, relative to 
other competitor sectors and regions. Obviously, both UK and EU industries will 
undergo behavioral changes in response to Brexit involving the spatial restructuring 
of input–output relationships, a reconfiguration of cross-border supply chains, and 
changes in their relative market presence in different regional markets. However, for 
this analysis, we explicitly make no assumptions regarding the nature of these behav-
ioral (monetary and trade) policy and strategic structural changes. Rather, our method-
ology simply allows us to calculate the different relative orders of magnitude of 
restructuring, which are eventually required for different industries in different regions 
in order to adjust to the tariff and nontariff cost increases associated with Brexit.
Our analysis is undertaken by building a novel Leontief price model that not only 
includes regional sectoral structure and value-chain effects but also incorporates the 
revealed spatial competition relationships underpinned by these value-chain structures 
across all UK and EU regions. We then analyze the change in the ability of firms in 
region/sector contexts to compete due to changes in the production costs or tariffs that 
have to be paid on sales markets due to Brexit. Understanding the orders of magnitude 
involved in these changes then allows us to identify the competitive vulnerability or 
opportunity of different regions and regional sectors in a post-Brexit context.
Our general finding is that within the UK, not only do the economically weaker 
regions display the highest levels of competitive vulnerability to Brexit but that the 
exact details of the post-Brexit UK–EU trading arrangement make little difference to 
the high levels of vulnerability exhibited by these weaker regions. In contrast, the UK’s 
economically stronger regions are relatively less vulnerable to Brexit, and also their 
relative vulnerability is reduced by a relatively freer UK–EU trading relationship. As 
such, Brexit is likely to make the UK’s regional inequalities worse. This has not been 
demonstrated before in such detail. In contrast, many EU regions display very limited 
competitive vulnerability to Brexit, but they are in general relatively more responsive 
to the nature of the post-Brexit UK–EU trade arrangements. In particular, we find that 
the variation in the effects of the different potential forms of Brexit (uncertainty) on the 
competitiveness of industries in regions is relatively small in the UK, whereas EU 
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regions typically have more to gain from a freer post-Brexit trading arrangement, 
although their overall levels of vulnerability are lower than for UK regions. In other 
words, the importance of the UK–EU negotiations on the type of Brexit is therefore 
mainly important for the rest of the EU and to a lesser extent for the economically 
stronger UK regions. In contrast, the economically weaker UK regions are likely to 
suffer the most, independent of the results of the negotiations on the future economic 
relation between the UK and the EU.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
disconnection between local community perspectives, political narratives, and the 
likely post-Brexit prospects for UK regions, which we then extend to the notion of 
competitive vulnerability or opportunity. This is followed by a section that introduces 
the concept of revealed competition, which integrates both value-chain interactions 
with spatial competition principles, as reflected in a revealed competition indicator. 
This is essential in order to allow us in the following section to map out the competitive 
vulnerability and opportunity of different industry-region combinations, and in the 
section after that to map out the sensitivity of regions to alternative post-Brexit UK– 
EU trade arrangements. The penultimate section examines some specific region- 
industry examples, and the final section provides conclusions.
The Context: Political Narratives, and the Geography of 
Discontent
In the 2016 EU Referendum, the main pro-Leave narrative was that of the UK 
regaining sovereignty and exercising its ability to take back control of the nation’s 
economic, social, and environmental policies. At the national level, one of the key pro- 
Brexit economic arguments was that breaking away from EU rules will allow the UK to 
become more competitive by being able to set its own competition, technical and 
regulatory standards, as well as its own independent trade agreements. According to 
these arguments, the purported improved competitiveness of the UK will in the long 
run offset any short-term adjustment difficulties associated with leaving the EU. These 
arguments have therefore also given rise to the claim that the specific nature of the 
post-Brexit UK–EU deal is critical for the UK’s long-run competitiveness, and almost 
all of the UK parliamentary discussions during 2016–20 have been related to the 
particularities of the potential post-Brexit UK–EU agreements.
These take back control economic narratives were also intertwined with social 
narratives based on the claim that the real beneficiaries of EU membership were the 
out-of-touch metropolitan elites, rather than the rest of the country, and the evidence 
suggests that these social arguments had real traction at the local level because it was 
the economically weaker regions that voted most strongly to Leave while the more 
prosperous regions tended to vote Remain. Today, the UK displays among the highest 
interregional inequalities in the industrialized world (McCann 2020), inequalities that 
give rise to a profound geography of discontent, and the specific geography of the EU 
Referendum voting patterns suggests that a profound geography of discontent was 
indeed at work (Los et al. 2017; McCann 2018, 2020) in which local economic 
conditions played a key role in how people responded to the 2016 UK–EU 
Referendum (Fetzer 2019). Indeed, evidence from many countries (Hendrickson, 
Muro, and Galston 2018; OECD 2018, 2019; Dijkstra, Poelman, and Rodríguez-Pose 
2019) suggests that these geography of discontent patterns are nowadays more widely 
observed. In economically weaker regions where people perceive that they are being 
increasingly marginalized or left behind by modern globalization, the voting behavior 
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(Rodríguez-Pose 2018) can result in something akin to a mutiny (Collier 2018) in 
which constituencies vote against the status quo without necessarily any clear sense of 
what the future might hold beyond a vague belief that things can only improve, a belief 
bolstered by the spurious claims of particular politicians. Indeed, this has been the 
experience in the UK, whereby the regions that voted most strongly in favor of Brexit 
are precisely those same regions with the greatest to lose in terms of trade-mediated 
demand (Los et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018) and policy support (Fidrmuc, Hulényi, and 
BörkeTunalı 2019).
In order to reexamine the pro-Brexit economic claims based on notions of competi-
tiveness, but specifically at the local and regional levels, we need to develop 
a framework that sets competitiveness in both a structural and spatial dimension. We 
examine the competitive vulnerability or opportunity that Brexit offers different indus-
tries in UK and EU regions under a no deal hard Brexit whereby UK–EU trade reverts 
to WTO terms. As already mentioned above, the explicit regulatory divergence priori-
ties and negotiation timelines of the UK government mean that any post-Brexit 
arrangement agreed to by the end of 2020 is likely to come relatively close to this 
default position. We also examine how sensitive are the competitive vulnerability or 
opportunity implications for UK and EU regions and sectors to alternative outcomes of 
any UK–EU post-Brexit trade negotiations, beyond a no deal hard Brexit. All of the 
analysis in this article use the PBL 2013 EUREGIO world regional input–output data 
set for 256 European NUTS2 regions and blocks of countries in the rest of the world 
that distinguishes between 61 industries (2 digit NACE revision 2) as a baseline (see 
Thissen et al. 2018, 2019 for a technical description), and which is the data set that 
underpins the EU’s own interregional economic analyses (Mercenier et al. 2016). This 
data set is constructed from national and regional data sets in combination with 
microsurvey data on the transportation of goods and business trips, and is especially 
designed for a pan-EU, industry-specific and regional cross-sectional analysis. It is 
currently the only data set available that enables a detailed sectoral analysis of 
competitive vulnerabilities and opportunities in European regions.2
Vulnerability and Opportunities in Revealed Regional 
Competition3
Revealed Competition as Regional Vulnerability to Brexit Trade Arrangements
Enhancing UK competitiveness by breaking away from EU regulations was a key 
narrative of the pro-Leave lobby fitting to the competitiveness-related policy goals of 
many regional, national, and supranational governments (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 
2017). However, the lack of consensus on a definition of regional competitiveness 
complicates both economic analysis and policy debates on competitiveness (Krugman 
1996) and its relation to Brexit. We therefore use the empirical measurement of 
revealed regional competition introduced in Thissen et al. (2013) and extensively 
2 It should be noted that while the data on regional trade are derived from survey-based microdata on the 
transport of goods, its subdivision in intermediate and final demand is an estimate. This may affect the 
cost effects in the Leontief price model. However, since no better (or alternative) data are available we 
cannot improve on these estimates. The revealed competition model is based on sales (trade destinations) 
and is therefore derived from the high-quality, product-specific total regional trade flows. The construc-
tion of the used data set is explained in Thissen et al. (2018) and Thissen et al. (2019).
3 Appendix A: Methodology, in the online material, provides technical details on the revealed 
competitiveness indicator in combination with value chain calculations using the Leontief price 
model.
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discussed in van Oort and Thissen (2017) as a measure for competitiveness. Combining 
this concept of revealed regional competition with region and sector-specific changes 
in production costs of industries using a multiregional Leontief price model enables us 
to analyze the region-industry specific competitive vulnerability and opportunities due 
to Brexit.
As a basic understanding, the principle of revealed competition between regions 
concerns the market overlap of regions when selling goods and services. Firms from 
Eindhoven, Cardiff UK, and Madrid (production locations), for instance, compete in 
Barcelona (sales market) where they all sell medical equipment. As such they have an 
overlap in their Barcelona sales market.4 When the firms from Eindhoven and Cardiff 
also sell medical equipment to the sales market in New York, while Madrid is not 
active on that market, firms from Eindhoven and Cardiff have a larger market overlap 
and a higher revealed competition than firms from either Eindhoven or Cardiff with 
Madrid.5 The size of a production location also plays a role in the degree of revealed 
competition. The firms from Cardiff face larger revealed competition from firms from 
Eindhoven than vice versa, since the production of medical equipment in Cardiff is 
smaller than in Eindhoven. Cardiff therefore has a smaller part of the different sales 
markets. By investigating market overlaps in sales markets with large regional detail, 
while covering the complete world as the overall sales market, we obtain insights into 
the most important sales markets and the largest market overlap of firms in these 
markets from different regions. By adding up the market overlap in all sales markets 
weighted with their region-specific importance, we get insights in the degree of 
revealed competition between firms from different regions. As in our small example 
of medical equipment sales, in our analysis of the consequences of Brexit on the 
competitive vulnerability and opportunities of firms in different regions, we then 
compare cost increases for specific sectors in specific regions with those of their 
competitors weighted with the degree of revealed competition between them. When 
cost increases of an industry in a specific region are less than the average of their 
competitors, this will give them a competitive opportunity. On the other hand, when 
cost increases are larger, this gives them a competitive vulnerability. The degree of 
revealed competition, and thereby the degree of competitive opportunities and vulner-
abilities, can also be decomposed into a domestic and an international effect by looking 
at the degree of revealed competition between firms producing in the same country or 
between firms producing in different countries.
We then also perform a wide-scale sensitivity analysis of the consequences of Brexit 
on regional competitive opportunities and vulnerabilities with respect to different forms 
of Brexit. We do this by calculating all possible effects on the competitive vulnerabil-
ities and opportunities of 61 industries in 256 European regions when 61 different 
1-percentage point tariffs between the UK and the remaining member states of the EU 
are introduced. These are elasticities of the competitive opportunities and vulnerabil-
ities of 61 different industries in 256 European regions with respect to 61 different 
tariffs. The degree of variation in these elasticities over different tariffs gives an 
indication of the vulnerability of a specific industry in a specific region to the specific 
details of the post-Brexit UK–EU trade agreements.
4 Example based on van Oort and Thissen (2017).
5 In the case of Brexit, the selling Cardiff firms will be impacted more directly when tariff changes are 
introduced than the Eindhoven or Madrid firms (provided that behavioral and policy circumstances do 
not change.
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Dealing with Supply Chain Effects: An Illustrative Example
Examining the implications of Brexit on regional, industry-specific competitive 
opportunities and vulnerabilities requires us to also consider more closely the issues 
of supply chains. Many firms and industries in Europe operate within complex cross- 
border supply chain systems, which means that the installation of new trade barriers 
has complex indirect as well as direct cost effects. Observation of tariffs schedules 
alone cannot tell us how costs for a specific industry in a particular region will 
increase, because we need to consider how these cost increases percolate throughout 
the whole of the supply-chain system across all other sectors and regions with which 
the firms are connected. Both must be explicitly taken into account.
In order to understand the nature and importance of the issue, we begin by using an 
illustrative example of the possible Brexit-related effect on the competitiveness of beer 
producers in different countries.
Suppose that steel produced in the UK and the Netherlands is used in the UK 
production of beer cans, which are then used by British, Dutch, and German beer 
producers located in the UK and also in the Netherlands and Germany. Thus, a Brexit- 
related tariff on steel being traded from the Netherlands to UK firms may not only 
result in higher direct UK steel prices but also may result in an increase in the 
production costs of many beer cans in the UK, and consequently in the final price of 
a can of beer. The cost effects of Brexit on the UK, Dutch, and German companies 
producing beer will depend in part on their ability to shift steel sourcing into or away 
from the UK, and also on the extent to which they directly compete with each other in 
the British, Dutch, and German consumer markets. Moreover, beer producers do not 
only use beer cans but also other inputs such as grains, insurance, information and 
communication technology, and financial services, etc., and each of these sectors will 
also be affected differently by Brexit due to their position within global value chains; in 
turn, these sectors will affect beer producers’ costs in different ways. As such, Brexit 
induces direct cost increases associated with the tariff- and nontariff-related costs and 
indirect costs that are transmitted via the input–output and global value-chain net-
works. The overall cost increase facing beer producers from the three different 
countries will depend on their own specific positioning within these complex config-
urations of cross-border input–output and global value-chain relationships also involv-
ing all other sectors and regions.
Although the costs of all beer producers will stay either equal or will increase, this does 
not, however, mean that the competitiveness of all beer producers falls. The reason is that it 
also depends on their spatial presence in different markets. The Dutch, British, and German 
beer-producing industries will have a different market presence in different regions. In 
regions where the three beer producers all have a major market presence, the differential 
tariff and nontariff cost effects of Brexit on each of the countries will imply that the 
competitiveness implications will be different for the three beer producers, with the 
producer whose costs increase the most facing the greatest loss of competitiveness in 
that particular market. In contrast, in regions where a particular beer producer has a very 
dominant position with little or no competition, the cost increases associated with Brexit 
will be mainly passed on to customers.
This particular beer production example demonstrates that the distributional com-
petitiveness effects of Brexit are not clear-cut, with some individual firms or sectors in 
specific regions potentially gaining competitive positions and associated market shares, 
while others will, in all likelihood, be losing out on all competitiveness dimensions. 
This is a characteristic of the industry-specific and regional-specific heterogeneity of 
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revealed competition (Thissen et al. 2013).6 As such, in order to understand the overall 
regional competitiveness implications of Brexit, we therefore need to examine the 
interactions between the input–output global value-chain cost implications and also the 
patterns of spatial competition across all UK and EU sectors and regions. In our 
analysis here we therefore extend these same principles to all UK and EU regions 
and sectors calculating all these interactions across the whole UK and EU economies, 
including all of the cross-region and cross-border value-chain and cost-chain structures.
Using this framework, we are also able to analyze to what extent the competitive 
position of beer producers is affected by the variance in the possible tariff-related effects 
due to different alternative post-Brexit tariff arrangements on all of their different inputs. In 
order to do this, we begin with the no deal base case scenario of Dhingra et al. (2017) and 
Dhingra, Machin, and Overman (2017) in which UK–EU trade operates under WTO rules 
and then one by one, we selectively remove the WTO-related tariff and nontariff costs 
associated with each individual sector from the overall system-wide cost calculations, in 
order to see how much the removal of any one particular sector from the WTO rules—due 
to their incorporation in any future UK–EU trade deal—changes the overall system-wide 
cost increases. So, in the above example of the beer producers, we solely remove the tariff 
and nontariff costs associated with the production of grains, and we then recalculate the 
overall cost increases for beer producers. We then reinstate the cost increases for grains 
back into the system and then remove the tariff and nontariff costs associated with steel and 
recalculate the overall cost changes, and then we repeat the exercise for financial services, 
etc. After doing this iteratively for all sectors, we can then examine the variance of the 
overall cost changes to the exclusion of any particular sector from WTO-schedules due to 
their inclusion in a UK–EU trade deal. In cases where this variance is low, it means that the 
trade-related changes associated with different alternative post-Brexit agreements will 
hardly alter the overall competitiveness implications for the beer producers, whereas in 
cases where this variance is high, the competitiveness implications for beer-producing 
firms, industries, and regions are indeed very sensitive to the specific details of the post- 
Brexit trade agreements. The same principle holds for all other sectors.
In order to understand how sensitive the competitive positions of industries, in 
particular UK and EU regions, to Brexit are, we therefore need to aggregate all of 
these sectoral effects for each region according to the presence of each of these sectors 
in each region and their particular spatial competition patterns and compare them over 
all possible Brexit scenarios. The overall construction of our revealed competition 
C indicator, which is specific to regions and sectors and combinations of individual 
product markets in which firms have a presence, is based on the framework of Thissen 
et al. (2013) and van Oort and Thissen (2017). The detailed analytical methodology is 
explained in Appendix A: Methodology in the online material.
The Innovative Contributions of This Approach
There are two key, novel elements of our approach that have not been undertaken or 
demonstrated before. First, we can examine the overall post-Brexit trade-related com-
petitive vulnerability and opportunity implications for cities and regions across the UK 
6 In a simple Hotelling-type of spatial competition model, a small reduction in costs, for example, due to 
a fall in the exchange rate, allows firms to dominate a market. However, this is not the case here because 
of the complexity of all the cross-border input–output and value-chain interactions whereby exchange 
rate movements have asymmetric and offsetting implications for different elements in the input–output 
global value. Indeed, the fall in the £/€ exchange rate since the 2016 EU Referendum has made no real 
difference to the UK’s global trade deficit or the UK’s trade deficit with the EU.
8
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
and EU. Moreover, within this we are also able to isolate those effects on revealed 
competition, which are related purely to the changes in regional and sectoral position-
ing in international markets from those that are related to changes in positioning only in 
domestic markets. These results are all reported in the next section. Second, we are 
able to split the Brexit-related implications into an economic analysis part that exam-
ines the overall effects (in terms of cost elasticities) of regional sectors to changes in 
tariff and nontariff barriers, and a political economy part that allows for the uncertainty 
associated with Brexit due to the variety in possible tariff and nontariff barrier 
combinations that may arise as a result of the political negotiations.7 Our methodology 
thereby separates the regional distribution of the estimated size and patterns of regional 
competitiveness implications across UK and EU regions from the eventual choice of 
(the as yet unknown) post-Brexit trade scenario. These results are reported in 
“Uncertainty of Brexit Implications.” In “Regional and Sectoral Specificity,” we then 
look at particular region-industry examples to highlight the types of competitive 
vulnerability and opportunity implications associated with different cases.
Mapping Production Cost Increases and Competitiveness 
Impacts
Using this methodology, we find that the likely effects of a hard Brexit on regional 
production costs and competitiveness will differ substantially over regions and sectors 
in the UK and in Europe. Figure 1 presents the estimated total production cost increase 
in all NUTS2 EU-regions. We see from the figure that there are large differences 
between the UK and the continent in the increase in costs when a hard Brexit is 
imposed. The cost increase faced by UK regions is far higher than for any other 
country, with other northwestern European countries and regions being the next most- 
severely hit areas. This general pattern broadly reflects the trade-exposure risk patterns 
described by Chen et al. (2018). Within the UK, especially those UK regions outside 
London (main core) and medium-sized city-regions like Manchester, Liverpool, and 
Leeds (secondary cores) are affected more. In mainland Europe, relatively larger cost 
increases can be seen in agricultural Zeeland and Flevoland in the Netherlands, Ireland, 
and south Hungary, and in production-intensive German regions— but never to the 
degree as in UK regions.8 The main reason for these differences in the cost effects are 
the sectoral compositions of production in different regions and the regional trade 
patterns of these regions. The cost effect is comprised of the two effects distinguished 
in our earlier methodology section. First, there is the tariff increase that induces a direct 
cost effect between producers who are trading between the UK and the member states 
of the EU. Introducing tariffs for goods and services entering or leaving the UK raises 
export and import prices for UK and EU firms trading with each other in final goods, 
and the degree of trade between UK regions and EU regions determines the size of this 
sales price-increasing effect. Second, there is the indirect or value-chain production 
cost effect due to intermediate products being used in production that also cross these 
UK–EU borders at some point in the value chain. The international value chains of 
industries in UK regions are generally highly impacted by tariffs, in contrast to similar 
industries in the EU where all interregional common market linkages are not affected.
7 We follow standard procedures in translating nontariff barriers into tariff barriers (Dhingra et al. 2017; 
Dhingra, Machin, and Overman 2017).
8 The Belgian region of Luxemburg has a particular high score due to an extremely dominant food 
specialization.
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In the hard Brexit scenario, most services have lower combined tariff and nontariff 
barriers than industry or agriculture. This causes a smaller sales price effect of Brexit 
for regions that have more services specializations. Moreover, since services use 
relatively fewer industrial and agricultural products in their production processes, 
they also have lower production cost increases. The larger cities tend also to have 
larger internal trade within the region, which also makes them less susceptible to 
Brexit. And finally, there is an international effect where regions that are competing 
more internationally in Europe will be hit more severely. Figure 1 though, does not 
reflect impacts from competitiveness structures (introduced in “The Context: Political 
Narratives and the Geography of Discontent”) yet, and we will return to this issue in 
a moment.
Figure 1. Total production cost increase in hard Brexit scenario in EU regions.
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As we see from Figure 1, the regional economies in the UK are likely to be hit substantially 
more in terms of rising costs than regions in other European countries. The total cost effect 
(tariff and value chain effect) is +1.7 percent for the UK as a whole, +0.8 percent for the 
Netherlands, and +0.4 percent for the EU as a whole (see Table 1). The cost increase effect of 
the UK is thus approximately two times higher than for the Netherlands and some four times 
greater than for the EU excluding the UK. In general, the magnitude of the relative differences 
in Brexit-induced cost increases between the UK and EU are very similar to the differences in 
Brexit trade-risk economic exposure reported by Chen et al. (2018). While tariffs are 
important for car manufacturing in the UK, it is tariffs on the food-producing sector that 
may be more important in the (agriculturally specialized) Netherlands. For specific sectors, 
cost increases may be much larger than the national averages. Calculated cost increases are 
particularly high for the car manufacturing industry in the UK (Bailey and de Propris 2017), 
but they are also substantial for other manufacturing and service sectors. Due to Brexit, the 
UK always faces substantially larger cost increases than other European countries in all 
sectors (Table 1). For example, in the manufacturing of motor vehicles (UK +12.8 percent, 
mainland Europe +2.2 percent), pharmaceutical products manufacturing (UK +1.2 percent, 
mainland Europe +0.3 percent), food products manufacturing (UK +3.9 percent, mainland 
Europe +1.3 percent), and in financial services (UK +0.8 percent, mainland Europe +0.1 per-
cent) and other business services such as publishing (UK +1.6 percent, mainland Europe 
+0.3 percent). Such cost increases are sufficient to wipe out the profit margins of many sectors 
in the UK (McCann 2016).
Yet, a cost increase for a specific sector in a specific region may be offset in terms of 
competitiveness when competing regions face similar or even higher cost increases. Regional 
changes in these competitive opportunities and vulnerabilities are calculated as cost increases 
for regions vis-à-vis all their sector and sales market specific competitors.
Products traded within the UK or within mainland EU will not be affected by Brexit tariffs 
and hence may become relatively cheaper compared to products that cross the UK–EU 
boundary. Applying the framework of revealed regional competition to our analyses of 
production costs, whereby regions are only compared to other regions with which they 
share both a spatial-specific and sector-specific market overlap, we can determine and 
demonstrate developments in their competitive positions in two different ways: including 
own-country competitors, and excluding these, hence focusing on international competitors 
of regions only (compare Thissen et al. 2013).9 Generally, a considerable amount of regional 
trade competition is between regions within the same country due to proximity, institutional 
and transport effects, and especially for services that are locally consumed (Burger et al. 
2014). On the other hand, it is especially international competition that represents a more level 
playing field for firms’ competitiveness in present day globalized economies (Iammarino and 
McCann 2013). For example, in the national-inclusive definition within the UK, the economy 
of Merseyside competes in niche markets with Manchester, Birmingham, Cheshire, 
Dortmund, and Munich, while in the national-exclusive, international-only definition, the 
economy of Merseyside competes with that of Dortmund and Munich only (Thissen et al. 
2013). We present regional competitive opportunities and vulnerabilities due to Brexit using 
both these definitions, since they provide additional and complementary insights.
Figure 2 shows the overall competitive opportunities and vulnerabilities of UK and EU 
regions that are associated with Brexit in the left-hand side panel, while the competition 
effects of the international-only (national-exclusive) opportunities and vulnerabilities are 
in the right-hand side panel. As we see in Figure 2, again the overall national and regional 
losses for the UK regions are much higher than for other EU regions. Some regions in the 
9 Note that when own-country competitors are excluded, all own-country sales markets are still included.
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Table 1  
Total Competitiveness, Cost Changes and Sensitivity to Brexit Scenario in UK Regions for Selected Industries.
EU Average NL Average UK Average
Greater 
Manchester Cheshire Merseyside
East Riding and 
North Lincolnshire
West 
Yorkshire Lincolnshire
West 
Midlands
Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire, 
and Oxfordshire
All sectors 0.11 (0.4) 0.48 (0.8) 0.54 (1.7) −0.15 (1.4) −0.20 (1.6) 0.33 (2.2) 0.47 (3.1) −0.09 (1.5) 0.50 (3.3) 0.10 (1.8) −0.06 (1.6)
Crop and animal production, hunting, and related service 
activities
0.0 (0.5) 0.8 (1.6) 1.3 (6.6) −0.2 (6.1) −1.7 (4.8) 0.6 (6.9) 2.6 (7.0) 0.0 (6.1) 1.5 (7.0) 2.4 (7.6) 1.2 (7.2)
Fishing and aquaculture −0.7 (0.2) −0.9 (1.9) 6.4 (8.2) 5.2 (6.9) 4.8 (6.5) 4.4 (6.1) 6.8 (9.3) 4.8 (6.5) 10.0 (11.9) 4.4 (6.2) 5.2 (6.9)
Mining and quarrying 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.5) −0.1 (0.4) −0.2 (0.3) −0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.7) −0.1 (0.4) 0.5 (1.1) 0.2 (0.7) 0.0 (0.5)
Manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco 
products
1.1 (1.3) 4.7 (5.5) −5.3 (3.9) −5.2 (3.1) −3.6 (2.5) −4.9 (3.1) −5.7 (6.4) −4.6 (4.8) −3.1 (7.5) −4.0 (5.6) −6.9 (4.2)
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather, and 
related products
0.2 (0.3) 4.8 (6.0) 3.2 (3.1) 3.4 (6.0) 0.6 (2.2) 2.3 (4.3) 4.2 (6.9) 2.0 (4.1) 2.4 (4.5) 2.2 (4.4) 2.4 (4.4)
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.4 (0.4) 0.6 (0.4) 1.4 (2.9) 2.0 (4.7) 0.6 (3.6) −1.0 (2.0) 6.1 (8.7) 0.1 (3.4) 2.1 (5.2) 2.5 (5.3) 0.3 (3.3)
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.6 (1.3) 0.8 (1.4) 0.5 (6.1) −2.7 (5.1) −0.5 (5.8) −0.2 (6.2) 0.7 (8.4) −3.6 (4.2) 4.2 (11.2) −1.3 (6.5) −3.9 (5.2)
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations
0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.3) 3.8 (1.2) 2.8 (3.9) −0.5 (0.7) 0.0 (0.5) 5.4 (6.4) 3.8 (4.8) 2.5 (3.6) 4.6 (5.7) 0.1 (1.3)
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.2 (1.0) −0.1 (1.0) 6.9 (7.7) 5.5 (11.1) 0.1 (6.1) 2.3 (7.7) 4.6 (11.6) 7.2 (12.5) 5.9 (12.3) 3.7 (10.1) 7.1 (12.4)
Manufacture of basic metals 0.2 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 6.7 (3.9) 6.0 (8.5) −0.9 (2.6) 1.9 (4.3) 6.6 (9.2) 5.6 (8.2) 8.5 (10.7) 4.7 (7.4) 6.3 (8.7)
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment
0.1 (0.2) 0.2 (0.4) 0.8 (1.8) 0.1 (2.1) −0.6 (1.5) −0.5 (1.4) 0.6 (3.0) −0.1 (2.0) 3.1 (5.0) −0.4 (1.7) −0.2 (2.0)
Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products 0.3 (0.7) 0.3 (0.6) 2.6 (1.5) 1.7 (3.3) −0.5 (0.8) −0.3 (1.1) 3.8 (5.3) 2.2 (3.8) 3.6 (5.2) 2.4 (4.0) 1.5 (3.3)
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.2 (0.6) 0.0 (0.8) 4.7 (5.0) 3.4 (9.1) −0.5 (2.9) 1.2 (3.9) 6.3 (11.9) 4.0 (9.6) 5.6 (11.5) 2.8 (8.9) 2.7 (9.5)
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers −0.1 (2.2) 0.0 (1.1) 11.0 (12.8) 5.4 (14.5) −0.7 (8.1) 8.9 (15.8) 18.0 (26.0) 6.1 (15.6) 10.3 (19.1) 4.1 (13.6) 4.8 (15.2)
Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.7 (1.4) 0.6 (1.3) 6.9 (6.2) 6.7 (10.7) 1.1 (4.4) 3.2 (6.3) 11.2 (16.1) 8.5 (12.6) 8.9 (13.4) 4.6 (9.0) 5.3 (10.0)
Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 0.4 (0.8) 0.5 (0.9) 3.0 (1.7) 1.6 (4.5) −2.5 (1.1) −1.6 (1.7) 5.3 (8.6) 1.5 (4.7) 4.7 (8.0) 1.4 (5.0) 0.8 (4.7)
Sewerage, waste management, remediation activities 0.1 (0.6) 0.1 (1.2) −0.1 (2.8) 0.6 (2.4) 0.1 (2.5) 0.9 (3.1) −0.1 (2.2) 0.1 (1.9) 0.3 (2.6) −0.1 (2.5) −1.4 (3.3)
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
0.1 (0.2) 0.8 (1.3) −2.7 (4.1) −0.4 (4.0) −0.1 (4.3) −0.8 (3.8) −5.9 (3.0) −1.6 (3.5) −4.8 (3.0) −1.7 (3.8) 0.3 (4.5)
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.2 (0.2) 0.8 (1.0) 0.8 (1.0) 0.7 (1.3) −0.1 (0.6) 0.3 (1.0) 0.5 (1.6) 0.5 (1.2) 1.1 (1.9) 0.7 (1.4) 0.6 (1.3)
Land transport and transport via pipelines 0.1 (0.2) 0.2 (0.2) −0.7 (1.4) −0.9 (0.8) 0.4 (1.7) 0.3 (1.6) −0.2 (1.9) −0.9 (0.9) −0.4 (1.6) −1.0 (0.9) −1.1 (0.9)
Water transport 0.5 (0.9) 0.3 (0.4) 0.0 (0.6) 0.1 (2.3) −2.3 (0.3) −2.0 (0.6) 0.3 (2.1) −1.9 (0.9) 8.2 (10.0) 1.7 (4.0) −0.6 (2.6)
Warehousing and support activities for transportation −0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 1.4 (1.8) 1.5 (2.0) 1.1 (1.5) 1.1 (1.6) 0.8 (1.8) 1.1 (1.7) 1.3 (2.1) 1.4 (2.0) 1.6 (2.2)
Accommodation and food service activities 0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.2) 1.9 (2.5) 0.8 (2.6) −0.8 (1.5) −0.2 (2.1) 2.6 (4.7) 0.8 (2.7) 3.1 (5.2) 1.7 (3.7) 1.2 (3.6)
Publishing activities −0.1 (0.3) −0.7 (0.5) 0.8 (1.6) 1.2 (1.9) 0.1 (1.1) 0.9 (1.9) 0.9 (1.5) 0.8 (1.5) 1.3 (1.9) 0.9 (1.8) 0.3 (1.9)
Motion picture, video, television program production; 
programming and broadcasting activities
−0.2 (0.3) −0.9 (0.2) 1.0 (1.6) 1.1 (1.7) 0.3 (1.1) 1.2 (2.1) 0.9 (1.5) 0.8 (1.4) 1.3 (1.9) 0.9 (1.7) 0.6 (1.9)
Telecommunications −0.1 (0.2) −0.3 (0.3) 1.1 (2.0) 1.2 (2.3) 0.5 (1.5) 1.0 (2.0) 1.1 (2.1) 0.8 (1.9) 1.6 (2.6) 1.0 (2.2) 0.7 (2.1)
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension 
funding
−0.1 (0.1) −0.3 (0.1) 0.8 (0.8) 0.9 (1.2) 0.8 (1.1) 0.9 (1.2) 0.7 (0.9) 0.9 (1.2) 0.9 (1.1) 0.8 (1.0) 0.6 (0.9)
Insurance, reinsurance, and pension funding, except 
compulsory social security
0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.5) −0.2 (0.3) −0.3 (0.4) 0.0 (0.7) 0.2 (0.9) −0.2 (0.3) 0.5 (1.2) −0.2 (0.3) −0.3 (0.4)
(continued )
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Table 1 
(Continued) 
EU Average NL Average UK Average
Greater 
Manchester Cheshire Merseyside
East Riding and 
North Lincolnshire
West 
Yorkshire Lincolnshire
West 
Midlands
Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire, 
and Oxfordshire
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance 
activities
−0.3 (0.2) 0.0 (0.1) 0.6 (1.7) 0.7 (1.1) 0.5 (0.9) 0.5 (0.9) 0.4 (0.7) 0.6 (1.0) 0.4 (0.8) 0.6 (0.9) 0.7 (1.0)
Imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings −0.2 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) 0.6 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 0.7 (0.0) 0.4 (0.0) 0.4 (0.0) 0.6 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0)
Scientific research and development 0.0 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 0.9 (2.2) 0.9 (1.8) 0.6 (2.4) 1.2 (2.1) 0.8 (1.6) 0.6 (1.4) 1.0 (1.9) 0.8 (1.7) 0.9 (1.8)
Advertising and market research −0.2 (0.1) −1.0 (0.2) 1.5 (1.3) 1.5 (1.2) 1.5 (0.9) 1.9 (1.6) 1.2 (1.1) 1.1 (1.0) 1.5 (1.3) 1.4 (1.2) 1.4 (1.2)
Other professional, scientific, and technical activities; 
veterinary activities
0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (2.2) 0.3 (1.9) −0.5 (2.0) −0.2 (2.4) 0.7 (1.5) 0.2 (1.4) 0.8 (1.9) 0.2 (1.7) −0.6 (1.9)
Travel agency, tour operator reservation service, and 
related activities
0.0 (0.2) −0.2 (0.2) 0.7 (0.3) 0.6 (0.9) 0.2 (0.2) 0.5 (0.3) 0.6 (1.0) 0.4 (0.8) 0.8 (1.2) 0.5 (1.0) 0.6 (1.1)
Residential care activities and social work activities without 
accommodation
0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) −0.3 (0.7) 0.0 (0.4) −0.1 (0.4) 0.9 (0.5) −0.4 (0.9) −0.4 (0.5) 0.4 (0.9) −0.7 (0.6) −0.7 (0.7)
Notes : The results for the EU, the Netherlands, and the UK are the weighted averages over the effects on sectors and regions. These average effects are not completely comparable to the total 
effects on the regional economies since not all feedback loops have been taken into account (see also equations 8 and 10 in the supplementary material). 
Grey in table: above average size sector (specialization) with divergent average certainty effect in the region. Dark grey: above average certainty of impact of Brexit (insensitive to the exact Brexit 
[non]tariff scenario).  Light grey: below average certainty of impact of Brexit (sensitive to the exact Brexit [non]tariff scenario). Numbers: effect on competitiveness—a negative number is an 
improvement in competitiveness. The cost increase numbers are between brackets. Selection of sectors: at least one element/cell in the row should be grey. 
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Low Countries, Ireland, plus a small number of Central European regions also experience 
competitive vulnerabilities. The severe competitive vulnerabilities across much of the UK 
are a major concern for UK long-run national productivity, especially at a time when the 
UK is facing severe productivity challenges (McCann 2016). At the same time, many other 
regions of Europe face competitive opportunities at the UK’s expense.
The difference between the left-hand (overall competition effects) and right-hand 
(international competition effects) panels in Figure 2 represents domestic competition 
effects.10 We see in Figure 2 that several regions in the UK actually are relatively strong 
in domestic competition effects, compensating for the losses in international competition. 
In the UK-only analysis, for example, as we see in the left-hand panel of Figure 2, there are 
a small number of northern (Greater Manchester, Leeds, and Cheshire), midlands 
(Shropshire and Staffordshire), and southern (Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, and 
Oxfordshire) UK regions whose competitiveness improves with Brexit, largely because 
the UK regions around them face even greater cost increases while being shielded from 
international competition. Yet, while their competitive opportunities increase, increasing 
costs are more likely to be transferred to consumers. Similarly, some French, Italian, 
Austrian, Spanish, Flemish, and Nordic regions face both international and domestic 
competitive opportunities, due to reduced competition from UK regions, whereas all 
German, Irish, and almost all Polish regions face competitive vulnerabilities.
The relative improvements in the positions of some regions, for example Cheshire, Greater 
Manchester, and West Yorkshire, is thus at the expense of the worsening of the positions of 
other nearby regions in the UK. The same holds for regions in Ireland. This is because the 
competitive positions of firms in regions relate to the relative direct and indirect cost effects of 
Figure 2. Competitive opportunities and vulnerabilities of a hard Brexit scenario in European 
regions.
10 See Appendix A: Methodology, in the online material,  for the precise definition.
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their competitors who often reside in nearby regions and are active on domestic markets. In 
a hard Brexit scenario, many UK-based firms will benefit from the direct increase in sales 
prices of EU competitors due to the imposed tariffs, but at the same time they will dispro-
portionally lose out on the indirect value-chain cost increases. These losses are distributed 
unevenly over regions and sectors. As a result, some UK firms will have competitive 
opportunities in the UK-internal market, mainly at the expense of other UK firms that are 
competitively more vulnerable. In terms of purely international competition, as we see in 
Figure 2, right-hand side, all UK regions lose out vis-à-vis non-UK EU regions, whereas the 
combined domestic plus international effect means that a small number of UK regions have 
competitive opportunities while the rest face competitive vulnerabilities.
Uncertainty of Brexit Implications
Variations in the exact design of any post-Brexit UK–EU treaty lead to uncertainty in 
assessing the post-Brexit competitiveness implications for different regions and different 
industries, such that there are different degrees of sensitivity to the variations of agreement 
design faced by different regions. However, the method we introduced (in “Vulnerabilities 
and Opportunities in Revealed Regional Competition”) and applied (in “Mapping 
Production Cost Increases and Competitiveness Impacts”) allows us to map the regional 
degree of sensitivity or uncertainty of Brexit impacts on competitive vulnerabilities and 
opportunities. Figure 3 shows the sensitivity to Brexit scenarios for Europe as a whole, 
including the UK, and Figure 4 focuses on the UK only.11 In terms of regional and sectoral 
implications, it is clear that the largest impacted regions in the UK (and on the mainland in 
Germany) display only limited sensitivity to the post-Brexit trade agreement design. In 
other words, no matter what exactly eventually emerges as the design of the post-Brexit 
agreement, the adverse economic effects will be relatively large in the UK. In the UK, 
Figure 4 shows that the economies of London and of the larger northern cities (Manchester, 
Liverpool, Edinburgh, Glasgow) however are relatively sensitive (more uncertain) to the 
implications of Brexit on their economies, while more peripheral regions are more certain 
of their (typically much more negative) implications. Thus, the larger cities still have a lot 
to gain (or rather potentially greater reductions in losses of competitiveness) from a good 
Brexit deal. Meanwhile, regional economies in France, Scandinavia, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Eastern Europe, which are specialized in agricultural production and/or 
(traditional) manufacturing activities, are also rather sensitive to the Brexit design scenario, 
whereas Belgian, Danish, and German regions display little sensitivity to the design 
(Figure 3). Figures 2, 3, and 4 should be viewed simultaneously in order to compare the 
competitiveness implications with the certainty of these implications so as to get a full 
picture of the regional competitiveness implications of Brexit.
Regional and Sectoral Specificity
Given the detail in our constructed data, the regional impacts can also be decom-
posed into industry-region specific implications, which are interesting for two reasons. 
11 The sensitivity to the Brexit deal is calculated in terms of the variance calculated as described in Appendix 
A Methodology in the online material. Figures 3 and 4 are based on relative variance of each region in 
comparison to the whole of Europe (Figure 3) and just the UK (Figure 4), respectively. The variance 
baselines in these two cases are different, given that the overall UK variance is much lower (the UK is less 
sensitive to the actual nature of the final deal) than that of the rest of Europe. As such, the scales are 
somewhat different in the two cases. Therefore, for example, in Figure 4, we see that Greater Manchester, 
West Yorkshire (Leeds), and West Midlands are all relatively sensitive or responsive to the nature of the final 
deal by UK standards, although by EU standards, as we see in Figure 3, they are relatively insensitive.
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First it shows the sometimes-large variation in the impacts over industry-region 
combinations that are hidden below the regional averages. Second, this information 
may be applicable to local policies more than national ones (McCann 2016). Table 1 
presents the combined (domestic plus international) competition effects (left-hand side 
of each cell) and the cost increase effects (in brackets in cells) for selected regions and 
industries in the UK, and in the Netherlands and the EU as a whole.12
The cost-increase effects can be substantial in region-industry combinations, but when 
other competing regions have larger cost-increasing effects, the relative competitiveness of 
regions can still improve due to Brexit. The grey scale of the cells in Tables 1 and 2 represents 
the sensitivity of the impacts to the nature of the Brexit deal of relatively large sectors only. It 
indicates whether changes in competitiveness depend on many different tariffs (darker grey) 
Figure 3. Sensitivity to Brexit scenario in European regions.
12 The full version for all UK and EU regions and industries is available on request.
16
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
or depend on only a few tariffs (lighter grey). In the former case, the relative effect of Brexit 
on competitiveness will be relatively independent of the Brexit scenario (or the nature of the 
final deal), while in the latter case, the actual negotiated political Brexit deal may have 
a strong effect on the actual effects of Brexit on competitiveness. It is this regional and 
sectoral specificity of the size of the effects, in combination with the likeliness of this effect, 
that is important for understanding the complexity of Brexit and providing local policy 
makers with the intelligence that is applicable to their situation.
Although our constructed data requires some caution for such detailed analysis, some 
sector-regional trends are robustly visible. To take as an example, Table 1 shows that the 
largest impacted industry in the UK is the motor vehicle industry, with major competitive 
vulnerabilities in the regions of the West Midlands, Merseyside, and East Riding. 
Combined with a small sensitivity to different Brexit scenarios, this implies that the 
automotive industries in these regions will be severely impacted on, irrespective of the 
nature of the final Brexit deal. The region of Cheshire, however, which is also home to 
a substantial automotive industry, actually has competitive opportunities because its sales 
and supply chains are relatively UK-oriented.13 However, these competitive opportu-
nities are at the expense of the other UK car-producing regions, which tend to be more 
export-oriented and have more international supply chains. In particular, the Cheshire 
automotive industry faces only an 8.1 percent cost increase, compared to 15.8 percent, 
Figure 4. Sensitivity to Brexit scenario in UK regions only.
13 However, our analysis only considers trade and production cost effects and does not consider the intra- 
corporate global strategy implications. In this regard, Pitas (2019) discussed a warning about the 
dangers of Brexit for the Cheshire facility of Bentley (VW) in Crewe. There is also widespread concern 
about the long-term future of the Vauxhall Astra plant in Ellesmere Port owned by Group PSA, the 
parent company of Peugeot-Citroën (BBC News 2018, 2019). In both cases, these plants are part of 
much larger EU-based global automotive manufacturers with opportunities for plant relocation to 
regions with little or no adverse post-Brexit competitiveness implications.
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and 26 percent increases in the West Midlands (Birmingham and Coventry), Merseyside 
(Liverpool) and East Riding of Yorkshire, and North Lincolnshire, respectively.
Other examples in Table 1 show that relatively certain (tariff-insensitive) impacts are in 
computer and optical manufacturing in Oxford, and the machinery and equipment 
manufacturing industries of West Midlands (Birmingham and Coventry), Merseyside 
(Liverpool), and West Yorkshire (Leeds-Bradford). Food production generally gains in 
competitiveness in the UK with little uncertainty.14 UK services, which tend to be concen-
trated in larger cities, are sensitive to the post-Brexit scenario and can be impacted when 
a hard Brexit scenario is applied, although many services (except for the City of London 
financial markets) are barely discussed in the negotiations between the UK and the EU.15
What is immediately apparent from the top line of Table 1 is that the competitive 
vulnerability in the UK is about five times larger than the EU as a whole, and the increase 
in costs is four times higher. This is due to the higher importance of cross-border 
competition for UK regions and its dependence on cross-border value chains. At the 
same time, the competitive vulnerability in the UK compared to the Netherlands appears 
to be only 12 percent higher, while UK cost increases are more than twice those of the 
Netherlands. The reason for the difference is the larger domestic competition in the UK 
with competitors that face comparable cost increases due to Brexit. The higher cost for UK 
firms is caused by the higher dependency on UK–EU cross-border value chains, almost all 
of which will be affected by cost increases, whereas relatively more of the Netherlands’ 
value chains remain unaffected by Brexit. Indeed, as we see in Figure 2 and Table 2, for 
many EU regions, the effects of Brexit on competitive vulnerabilities and opportunities are 
negligible. In other words, the relatively large competitive vulnerability of UK regions to 
Brexit is borne largely by the UK’s firms and industries, which are heavily engaged in UK– 
EU trade, the same firms that are essential for driving the UK’s overall productivity 
agenda. At the same time, it is likely for UK consumers to pay for a large share of the 
costs, since the relative cost effect on UK firms is much smaller than the absolute cost 
effect, giving UK firms the possibility to pass on a large part of the cost increase to UK 
consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
Comparable to Table 1, Table 2 presents the combined competition effects and cost 
increase effects (in brackets in cells) for selected regions and industries in mainland 
Europe. As can also be seen from Figure 2, the analyzed regions strongly contrast in 
terms of their competitiveness change in comparison to Table 1. The implications and 
cost increases in these mainland EU regions are on average much smaller than in their 
UK counterparts. Still, even relatively small changes in cost structures can lead to 
significant competitive vulnerabilities or opportunities in detailed region-sector com-
binations. Sectors that on average are vulnerable in UK regions (Table 1), tend on 
average to have an opportunity in the EU mainland regions (Table 2), but this is not 
necessarily the case in all region-sector combinations.
The regions of Zuid-Holland and Zeeland in the Netherlands, Oberbayern (Munich), 
and southern and eastern Ireland (Dublin) face on average competitive vulnerabilities, 
but for varying underlying reasons. In Zuid-Holland and Zeeland, large agricultural 
specializations have a negative impact, yet this is very sensitive to the details of the 
Brexit scenario. More certain for both regions is the competitive vulnerability of their 
14 It should be noted that potential UK behavioral and policy changes in sectors, such as changes in 
agricultural policy eventually replacing the EU policy in this sector, are not included in our analyses.
15 Note that in Table 1 the degree of uncertainty is calculated from the perspective of the region. This 
implies mathematically that high or low uncertainty is determined relative to the average uncertainty 
over the sectors in the region.
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Table 2  
Total Competitiveness, Cost Changes and Sensitivity to Brexit Scenario in Mainland EU Regions for Selected Industries.
Zuid- 
Holland Zeeland
Vlaams 
Brabant
Île de 
France
Rhône- 
Alpes Norte Steiermark
Southern and 
Eastern 
Ireland Cataluña Oberbayern Sydsverige
All sectors 0.40 (0.9) 0.88 (1.7) −0.09 (0.5) −0.04 (0.1) −0.06 (0.1) −0.14 (0.2) −0.04 (0.1) −0.18 (0.7) −0.10 (0.1) 0.27 (0.9) −0.01 (0.3)
Crop and animal production, hunting, and 
related service activities
1.2 (2.0) 1.3 (2.4) 0.2 (0.7) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.3 (0.6) 0.0 (0.3) −0.3 (0.2) −0.4 (0.2) −0.6 (0.1)
Fishing and aquaculture 1.6 (3.0) 0.3 (2.9) −1.8 (0.5) −0.7 (0.1) −0.7 (0.1) −0.2 (0.0) −0.1 (0.1) x −0.9 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) −0.4 (0.1)
Mining and quarrying −0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.3) 0.8 (0.9) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.3 (0.5) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0)
Manufacture of food products; beverages 
and tobacco products
9.1 (11.8) 8.2 (10.7) −1.8 (1.5) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.5) 0.0 (0.2) 3.9 (5.2) 0.2 (0.3)
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather, and related products
1.1 (5.8) 11.0 (14.0) −4.1 (1.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1)
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products
1.1 (1.5) 1.0 (1.5) 0.1 (0.3) −0.1 (0.0) 0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 0.3 (0.8) −0.1 (0.1) −0.5 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2)
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products
0.4 (0.9) 0.9 (1.9) 0.6 (1.5) 0.0 (0.1) −0.3 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) −0.7 (0.5) 0.0 (0.1) 1.2 (2.3) 0.0 (0.0)
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical 
preparations
0.0 (0.4) 0.2 (0.5) 0.0 (0.4) −0.1 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.4) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) x
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.0 (1.3) 0.6 (2.5) −0.5 (1.3) −0.4 (0.5) −0.2 (0.7) −0.2 (0.1) −0.3 (0.4) −2.2 (2.8) −0.4 (0.1) −0.5 (0.5) −0.1 (1.3)
Manufacture of basic metals −0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.6) 0.5 (1.2) −0.1 (0.2) −0.1 (0.3) 0.3 (0.7) −0.2 (0.1) −0.8 (0.6) 0.2 (0.5) 0.2 (0.7) 0.3 (1.0)
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment
0.1 (0.3) 0.4 (0.7) 0.2 (0.5) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −1.2 (1.0) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2)
Manufacture of computer, electronic, and 
optical products
0.3 (0.7) 0.4 (1.0) 0.1 (0.6) −0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.4) 0.0 (0.5) −0.1 (0.2) 1.7 (2.7) −0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.4 (1.2)
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n. 
e.c.
0.3 (1.0) 0.0 (1.1) 0.2 (1.2) −0.1 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) −0.3 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) −0.7 (1.8) −0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.6) 0.2 (1.0)
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailer,s and 
semitrailers
0.8 (5.0) 1.9 (12.1) 0.4 (5.0) −0.8 (0.3) −1.4 (0.2) −1.0 (1.4) −0.5 (0.1) −2.6 (1.4) −1.1 (0.5) 0.5 (2.5) 0.2 (5.8)
Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.1 (0.9) 2.6 (5.5) −0.3 (0.8) −0.2 (0.3) −0.6 (0.4) −1.5 (0.2) 0.2 (1.3) −0.5 (1.4) 0.6 (2.8) −0.3 (0.5) 2.7 (4.9)
Manufacture of furniture; other 
manufacturing
0.2 (0.8) 1.0 (1.9) 0.2 (0.7) −0.5 (0.1) −0.4 (0.1) −0.7 (0.1) 0.2 (0.6) x −0.8 (0.1) 0.3 (0.7) 0.3 (1.0)
Sewerage, waste management, remediation 
activities
0.3 (1.2) 0.3 (1.0) 0.4 (2.0) −0.4 (0.1) −0.6 (0.5) −0.8 (1.6) 0.0 (0.1) −0.2 (0.3) −0.6 (0.3) −0.3 (0.4) 0.4 (0.8)
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
0.6 (1.4) 1.3 (2.8) 0.2 (0.5) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −2.6 (0.6) 0.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.1)
(continued )
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Table 2 
(Continued) 
Zuid- 
Holland Zeeland
Vlaams 
Brabant
Île de 
France
Rhône- 
Alpes Norte Steiermark
Southern and 
Eastern 
Ireland Cataluña Oberbayern Sydsverige
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
0.7 (1.1) 2.3 (2.7) 0.0 (0.4) x x −0.5 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −4.4 (0.5) −0.3 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) −0.2 (0.0)
Land transport and transport via pipelines 0.0 (0.0) 0.7 (1.0) −0.3 (0.2) −0.2 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.6 (0.8) −0.1 (0.0) −1.9 (0.7) −0.1 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) −0.2 (0.0)
Water transport 0.0 (0.1) 0.2 (0.4) 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 2.0 (2.8) 1.1 (2.1) 1.5 (2.0) 0.0 (0.3) 0.0 (0.1)
Warehousing and support activities for 
transportation
−0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.4) −0.1 (0.2) −0.2 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) −0.4 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.4) −0.2 (0.2) −0.3 (0.2) −0.2 (0.1)
Accommodation and food service activities −0.2 (0.1) 0.2 (0.5) 0.3 (1.4) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) −0.7 (0.1) 0.1 (0.2) −1.9 (0.7) −0.2 (0.1) 0.3 (0.6) 0.0 (0.0)
Publishing activities 0.1 (0.5) −2.0 (0.4) −0.3 (0.7) −0.1 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) −1.1 (0.2) −0.1 (0.1) 0.0 -(100.0) −0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.3)
Motion picture, video, television program 
production; programming and 
broadcasting activities
−0.2 (0.4) −2.2 (1.1) −0.2 (0.2) −0.1 (0.1) −0.4 (0.9) −2.5 (0.7) −0.2 (0.2) 0.2 (0.9) −0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) −0.1 (0.6)
Telecommunications −0.1 (0.1) −1.1 (0.9) −0.6 (0.4) −0.1 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) −1.2 (0.3) −0.1 (0.0) −1.2 (0.7) −0.4 (0.1) 0.0 (0.3) −0.3 (0.3)
Financial service activities, except insurance 
and pension funding
−0.2 (0.1) −0.6 (0.5) −0.1 (0.1) −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) −0.1 (0.3) −0.1 (0.0) −0.4 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0)
Insurance, reinsurance, and pension funding, 
except compulsory social security
−0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.3) 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) −0.3 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.2) 0.1 (0.4) 0.0 (0.1) 0.3 (0.4)
Activities auxiliary to financial services and 
insurance activities
−0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.1) −0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.6) −1.2 (0.3) −0.3 (0.2) −0.1 (0.0)
Imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0)
Scientific research and development −0.3 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1) −0.1 (0.2) −0.1 (0.1) −0.1 (0.1) 0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) −0.7 (0.8) −0.1 (0.0) −0.1 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Advertising and market research −0.9 (0.1) −2.5 (1.2) −0.4 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.1) −0.3 (0.7) −0.1 (0.1) −0.7 (0.2) 0.0 (0.1) −0.3 (0.0) −0.1 (0.1)
Other professional, scientific, and technical 
activities; veterinary activities
0.0 (0.1) 0.2 (0.5) 0.0 (0.2) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 0.6 (0.7) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1)
Travel agency, tour operator reservation 
service, and related activities
−0.2 (0.2) 0.0 (0.4) −0.3 (0.4) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (1.0) −0.1 (0.6) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.1)
Residential care activities and social work 
activities without accommodation
0.0 (0.0) 0.2 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.0) 0.2 (0.0) −0.2 (0.1) −0.1 (0.0) x −0.2 (0.1) 0.2 (0.0) 0.3 (0.0)
Grey in table: above average size sector (specialization) with divergent average certainty effect in the region. Dark grey: above average certainty of impact of Brexit (insensitive to the exact Brexit 
[non]tariff scenario).  scenario. Light grey: below average certainty of impact of Brexit (sensitive to the exact Brexit [non]tariff scenario). Numbers: effect on competitiveness - a negative number 
is an improvement in competitiveness. The cost increase numbers are between brackets. Selection of sectors: at least one element/cell in the row should be grey. 
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chemical specializations (in Zeeland with the Terneuzen Dow Chemical plant, and in 
Zuid-Holland with the petrochemical port complex of Rotterdam). Both regions are 
also certainly impacted on retail trade. Zuid-Holland further is more impacted by 
machinery and equipment industries and food production industries. Note that despite 
the average competitive vulnerability of these regions, certain industries may improve 
their competitive positions (like warehousing, telecommunication, and financial ser-
vices). Oberbayern (Munich) then is negatively (and certainly) impacted in terms of its 
automotive industry, machinery manufacturing, and food production industries, while 
gaining in rubber and plastics production and petroleum products. The gains in 
business services in Munich are relatively uncertain and dependent on the post- 
Brexit scenario. As another example, the region around Dublin faces competitive 
vulnerability in its food production industries, while simultaneously having competi-
tive opportunities in its chemical industries and in land transport activities.
Table 2 shows that regions have competitive opportunities because of different 
compositional effects as well. Ile the France (Paris) wins in its automotive and 
machinery production industries, and in transport and telecommunications. Yet, the 
competitive opportunities in business services in Paris and surroundings are strongly 
dependent on the exact post-Brexit scenario. The positive impact in Vlaams-Brabant 
(Leuven) in Belgium is driven by its food manufacturing industries and telecommuni-
cations. Competitive opportunities in the Portuguese Norte (Porto), Steiermark (Graz), 
and Catalunya (Barcelona) regions are related to machinery and automotive industry, 
rubber and plastics manufacturing, and telecommunications, respectively.
As such, winning and losing regions and sectors are scattered across Europe, and 
although less than their UK counterparts, they are still impacted to an extent and degrees 
of uncertainty that warrants close attention from national and local policy makers.
Conclusions and Discussion
We apply a novel methodology that disentangles region-sector sensitivity to (non)tariff 
barriers (elasticities) from scalable impacts of scenarios, and include spatial competition 
effects in which regional-specific and industry-specific implications on firms’ competitive 
opportunities and vulnerabilities depend on their market shares in their domestic and export- 
serving regions and the cost increases that competitors that are active on these same markets 
face. Examining the initial impact of Brexit before the substitution of intermediate inputs 
takes place and without behavioral adjustments by public and private sectors, we find that the 
effects of a hard Brexit scenario on regional production costs and the competitive position of 
firms are much higher for sectors and regions in the UK than in the EU as a whole. This is 
because the UK value chains are far more integrated in the EU economy than vice versa, 
whereas for the EU they are on average a smaller mirror image of the UK effects. A loss in 
one’s competitive position is another’s gain, and since the major competition for the UK and 
its regions comes from the rest of Europe while the UK is much smaller than the EU, the EU 
must on average face mirrored smaller competitive vulnerabilities and opportunities than the 
UK. We also show that the region-specific and sector-specific outcomes for the UK result in 
some cases in large competitive vulnerabilities that threaten whole local industries. 
Meanwhile, the certainty of the negative implications on all UK regions, and to a much lesser 
extent on many northwestern EU regions, is in marked contrast with the uncertainty of the 
potentially positive implications for many southern European regions.
From our results presented here (especially Figures 2, 3, and 4, and Tables 1 and 2), we see 
that there is large variation in the post-Brexit implications for sector- and region-specific 
competitive opportunities and vulnerabilities that deviate from their respective national 
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effects. Indeed, some specialized regions may even have competitive opportunities at the 
expense of nearby competing regions. The UK’s existing interregional inequalities, which are 
already very high by international standards, are likely to increase as a result of Brexit. In 
addition, within the UK, the competitiveness of the relatively weaker parts of each of the 
broad macroregions tend to be more severely hit (and with more certainty) than the more 
prosperous parts of each of the macroregions. For instance, within the broad macroregion of 
the south of England, the areas whose competitiveness is most adversely affected by Brexit 
are East Anglia, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, and Kent, while London, and the western arc 
around London through the Thames Valley, actually gain in competitiveness. As such, the 
competitive position of the economically stronger parts of the south of England is likely to 
increase relative to the economically weaker areas of the south of England. Similar develop-
ments can be observed in the Midlands and the north (including Scotland) where the 
economically stronger parts of these regions face less adverse competitiveness shocks than 
the economically weaker parts of the Midlands and north of England.
In marked contrast, across the rest of the EU, it is generally the weaker and more 
geographically peripheral regions in the southern and eastern fringes of the EU that 
benefit in terms of competitive opportunities due to the cost increases associated with 
Brexit. Other noticeable regions that have Brexit-related competitive opportunities are 
urban regions, such as Paris, Barcelona, Madrid, and Stockholm, although these effects 
are sensitive to the nature of the final deal.
A possible limitation of our analysis is that we arrive at fairly clear-cut conclusions using 
the best available EU-wide interregional data, while we have not discussed the possible 
behavioral responses to the post-Brexit context, including the restructuring of input–output 
and supply-chain relations, corporate internal restructuring, changes in subcontracting or 
marketing strategies, or monetary, trade, and sectoral policies, as these are too complex and 
myriad for this article. However, our conclusions provide details regarding the relative orders 
of magnitude of the scale of restructuring that regions and industries are likely to have to 
undergo in order to adapt to Brexit. The economically weaker areas of the UK would 
systematically need to display greater resilience and adaptability to trade-related shocks 
than the more prosperous regions, simply in order to leave the already very high UK 
interregional inequalities unchanged. Yet, many of the UK’s weaker regions have low levels 
of structural embeddedness (Kitsos, Carrascal-Incera, and Ortega-Argilés 2019), and there-
fore their ability to withstand shocks is very limited. Indeed, the long-run regional productiv-
ity statistics for UK regions would suggest that the likelihood that the weaker regions will be 
more resilient to Brexit-related shocks than more prosperous regions is very small, to say the 
least (McCann 2016). Indeed, the emerging evidence supports our analysis (Fetzer and Wang 
2020). In contrast to the UK, in the rest of the EU, it is the economically weaker regions in the 
south and east of Europe that will generally be required to undertake lower levels of post- 
Brexit restructuring than many of the more prosperous regions in the north and west of 
Europe, and the more prosperous regions are indeed likely to be better equipped to adapt than 
the less prosperous regions. However, whether or not interregional inequalities will actually 
rise or fall in mainland Europe also depends much more on the actual post-Brexit UK–EU 
arrangements, since the effects are very uncertain for mainly agricultural and traditional 
industrial regions.
The details of the final Brexit deal will affect the certainty of the impacts. The number of 
potential different tariffs increases with the hardness of the Brexit deal, increasing the 
uncertainty of the potential effects, especially in the EU. When considering the implications 
of the nature of a final Brexit deal in more detail for the competitive positions of regions and 
nations, it also becomes clear that details of the deal, which may be important for particular 
UK regions, are not necessarily important for the UK as a whole, and similarly what is 
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important for the UK is not necessarily important for the EU or other EU countries. As such, 
the fact that the trade negotiations are conducted at a UK-national and EU-wide level means 
that regional competitiveness implications of Brexit are likely to be largely asymmetric 
between the UK and EU, and the granularity of sector-region–specific impacts and sensitivi-
ties to the post-Brexit arrangements provides important intelligence for regional and local 
policy.
A final important conclusion is that our analyses do not imply that the UK and the EU 
should not try to negotiate a new trade deal that is as open as possible. Almost all of the 
available evidence concludes that a more comprehensive deal will be in the interests of both 
parties. However, as we have seen, the UK’s losses of regional competitiveness are more 
certain and less sensitive to the exact design of a Brexit deal than the potential gains in 
regional competitiveness of other regions, and this is partly due to the fact that the larger 
losses are concentrated in the UK. In particular, our results imply that regional interests and 
the national interests are not closely aligned, and this is particularly the case for the UK. Brexit 
is likely to exacerbate UK interregional inequalities, and these changes will heavily counter-
act the leveling-up (Zymek and Jones 2020) agenda of the UK government.
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